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FOURTH AMENDMENT-PEN REGISTER SURVEILLANCE
Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979).
A perplexing issue recently confronting courts
concerns the use of the pen register' as a law
enforcement tool. Some confusion was diminished
by the United States Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. New York Telephone Co.2 that pen
registers are not governed by Title III of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968'
because they do not acquire the contents of com-
munications as defined by the Act.4 That opinion,
however, left unresolved the issue of whether pen
register surveillance was subject to the require-
ments of the fourth amendment.5
In the case of Smith v. Maryland6 the United States
Supreme Court resolved the issue by holding that
the installation and use of a pen register is not a
search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment and, therefore, no warrant is required. The
Court affirmed the appellate court's decision that
the phone company's installation at its central
' "A pen register is a mechanical device that records
the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring
the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the
telephone is released. It does not overhear oral com-
munications and does not indicate whether calls are
actually completed."... A pen register is "usually
installed at a central telephone facility [and] records
on a paper tape all numbers dialed from [the] line"
to which it is attached.
Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2578 n.l (1979)
(citations omitted).
2434 U.S. 159 (1977); see Note, Fourth Amendment-
Electronic Surveillance, 69 J. Crim. L. & C. 493 (1978),
discussing that case.
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
4 See 434 U.S. at 166-67.
5 See id. at 165 n.7. Similarly in United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 554 n.4 (1974)(Powell, J., con-
curing in part and dissenting in part), the Court did not
resolve the question of whether the fourth amendment
restrictions on searches applied to the use of pen registers.
The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. It is made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"99 S. Ct. 2577 (197!).
offices of a pen register to record all numbers dialed
from the defendant's phone did not constitute a
search and was not, therefore, in violation of the
fourth amendment, even though the police, who
requested the installation, had not obtained a war-
rant.
I
Defendant Smith was charged with having
robbed Patricia McDonough on March 5, 1976.
The victim, who had a full-face view of the robber
in the course of the robbery, gave the police a
description of the assailant and his automobile.
Shortly after the robbery, McDonough received
a series of threatening and obscene telephone calls
from an individual who identified himself as the
robber. On March 15, McDonough received such
a call requesting that she step out on her porch.
She did so and observed the car which she had
earlier described to the police, driving slowly by
her home. On March 16, police discovered the
license number of the described vehicle and learned
that it was registered to defendant Smith.
On March 17, the telephone company, at the
request of the police, installed a pen register at its
central offices to record the phone numbers of calls
made from the telephone at Smith's residence.
Neither a warrant nor a court order authorized the
installation of the pen register. On March 17, a call
was made from Smith's residence to the victim's
home. Thereafter, the police obtained a warrant to
search Smith's automobile and residence. The
search of the residence revealed that a page in
Smith's telephone book containing the name and
number of the victim was turned down. On March
19, McDonough viewed a six-man lineup at police
headquarters and identified Smith as her assailant.
II
The state trial judge overruled the defendant's
pretrial motions to suppress the evidence obtained
by the pen register, holding that the warrantless
installation of the pen register did not violate the
fourth amendment.7 The electronically obtained
7Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 173, 389 A.2d 858, 867
(1978).
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evidence was admitted; Smith was found guilty of
robbery and was sentenced to ten years in prison.
8
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, the highest
court of the state, affirmed the judgment of the
trial court and rejected the defendant's contention
that pen registt r surveillance constitutes a search
subject to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment.9 Adopting the two-fold test estab-
lished in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v.
United States'0 that the fourth amendment is applied
where a person has exhibited a subjective expec-
tation of privacy and where society is prepared to
recognize the expectation as reasonable, the Court
held that there is no constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers
dialed into a telephone system."
The conclusion reached by the court of appeals
was based heavily on its determination that the
expectation of privacy protected by the fourth
amendment attaches to the content of a telephone
conversation and not to the fact that a conversation
took place,' 2 and further, that telephone subscrib-
ers have no reasonable expectation that records of
their calls will not be made. 3 The court saw little
practical difference, insofar as public awareness
was concerned, between the maintenance of rou-
tine telephone billing records and a pen register
record.
Further, the court analogized the defendant's
situation to that of the defendants in United States
v. Miller14 and United States v. White.' 5 In Miller, the
Court held that a bank depositor has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of checks
and deposit slips turned over to the bank; the
depositor takes the risk that the information will
be conveyed by the bank to the government.' 6 In
White, statements made by the defendant were
overheard by government agents by means of a
hidden transformer worn by an informer during
his meetings with the defendant. The Court found
no constitutionally protected expectation of pri-
vacy that the informer would not transmit the
8 The Supreme Court decision, citing the trial record,
noted that the defendant was sentenced to six years. 99
S. Ct. at 2579. The Maryland court's decision, however,
stated that Smith was sentenced to 10 years. 283 Md. at
160, 389 A.2d at 860.
9283 Md. at 174, 389 A.2d at 868.
iS 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
283 Md. at 173, 389 A.2d at 867.
12 Id. at 167-68, 389 A.2d at 864.
'3 Id. at 168, 389 A.2d at 865.
14 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
'5401 U.S. 745 (1971).
'6 425 U.S. at 443.
conversation to the police. 7 The court of appeals
concluded that a similar situation existed in the
case of telephone calls. While the content of a call
is not revealed to the telephone company, the
information as to the number dialed is necessarily
revealed. Since the caller can have no reasonable
expectation that the numbers he dials are confi-
dential, the court held that the information ob-
tained by the telephone company may be used by
the prosecution in court.' 8
In addition, the court likened the use of a pen
register to the use of a mail cover.19 In each situa-
tion, the court reasoned, communications travel
through public conveyances; in each, the surveil-
lance reveals only the destination or origin of the
communication, not the content of the message
itself. Noting that, if anything, the use of a mail
cover is more an invasion of privacy than a pen
register since it reveals the identities of the parties,
the court remarked that, nonetheless, courts have
generally held that the use of mail covers does not
violate the fourth amendment.'2
The court's decision appears to be based in large
part upon its belief that pen registers simply do not
threaten privacy to the same extent as do actual
interceptions of oral communication. Pen registers
do not reveal whether a communication even oc-
curred because they do not indicate whether an
outgoing call was actually completed. Moreover,
such devices are regularly used without a court
order for checking billing operations and detecting
fraud. According to the court of appeals, the intru-
sion involved in pen register surveillance is mini-
mal; no violation of the integrity of the communi-
cation system is entailed.2'
17 White was decided on pre-Katz law. 401 U.S. at 754.
18283 Md. at 172, 389 A.2d at P66-67.
'9A 'mail cover' is conducted by furnishing the
Government with information appearing on the face
of the envelope addressed to the particular address:
i.e., addressee, postmark, name and address of sender
(if it appears), and class of mail. The actual mail is
delivered to the addressee and only the letter-car-
rier's notation reaches the Government agency
which requests the mail cover.
United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472, 475 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1968).
2, That conclusion may be questionable. As the court
itself noted, post-Katz authority upholding mail covers is
limited and such holdings have been narrow in scope.
283 Md. at 173, 389 A.2d at 867. See United States v.
Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1087 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied.
425 U.S. 958 (1976); United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d
at 476; United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743, 750
(N.D. I11. 1972).
2i 283 Md. at 174, 389 A.2d at 868.
[Vol. 70
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Three judges dissented from the majority view
and concluded that Smith had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy and that a warrant was required.
Judge Eldridge in his dissent, in which Judge
Digges joined, noted that the defendant by the
simple act of dialing local numbers did not reason-
ably intend to reveal information but merely made
use of machinery in particular ways which, without
the police intrusion, would have remained fully
private. The Miller case was distinguishable, ac-
cording to Eldridge, by the fact that in the normal
course of the bank's business it kept copies of the
checks and deposit slips which could readily be
turned over to the government; whereas, here,
without the government's intrusion, the telephone
company would not have kept any record of the
local calls and could not have revealed any infor-
mation concerning the calls to anyone.
2
The focus ofJudge Cole's dissent was the nature
of a search itself. Cole defined a search as a step in
a criminal investigation by the government which
focuses on the gathering of any type of information
or clues possibly relevant to prosecution.23 Con-
cluding that technologically a distinction between
verbal and digital transmissions is absurd, Cole
noted that there could be no doubt that the fact
that the defendant made certain calls from his
home telephone was highly relevant information.2
Cole distinguished both the White and Miller
cases because the telephone company in this case
was not a "party" to Smith's calls in the same sense
as the informant in White and the bank in Miller
were parties to the communications therein in-
volved. At the very least, Cole reasoned, Smith had
a reasonable expectation that the telephone com-
pany would not, without the safeguards of appro-
priate legal process, act for the government in
collecting information relevant to a criminal pros-
ecution.s2
Further, Cole rebuked the majority's analogy to
mail covers as unconvincing. Cole noted that while
use of the postal service involves essentially public
facilities where any writing on the outside of an
envelope or on a postcard can be read easily by
postal employees, telephones are placed in the
home to provide privacy regarding the parties to
and content of a conversation.
2
6
Finally, Cole warned of possible abuses of pen
registers. Newer models of pen registers, Cole
22 Id. at 177, 389 A.2d at 869 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 180, 389 A.2d at 871 (Cole, J., dissenting).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 185, 389 A.2d at 873.
"1Id.
pointed out, have ahtomatic voice actuated
switches which can automatically turn a tape re-
corder on and off as the telephone is used.2 In
Cole's opinion, pen registers should not be installed
absent a warrant.
III
Unlike the opinion of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, the opinion of the United States Su-
preme Court did not focus on the nature of the
intrusion by the use of the pen register. In fact, the
Court only briefly noted that a pen register does
not acquire the contents of the communication,
remarking that the defendant's argument must rest
upon a claim that he had a legitimate expectation
of privacy regarding the numbers he dialed on his
phone.28
The defendant's claim was rejected by an appli-
cation of the two-pronged test formulated by Jus-
tice Harlan in his concurrence in Katz. As noted
before, that test asks first whether the individual
has exhibited by his conduct a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, and, second, whether society is
prepared to recognize the individual's subjective
expectation of privacy as reasonable.
29
The Court easily resolved the first part of the
inquiry, concluding that people do not entertain
any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers
they dial.30 The Court accepted the rationale of the
lower courts that telephone callers know they must
convey phone numbers to the phone company,
that they know the phone company has recording
facilities for this information, and that they know
the phone company makes routine ise of pen
registers for legitimate business purposes.31 Further,
the Court concluded that it was immaterial that
the telephone was in the defendant's home. Ac-
cording to the Court, the defendant had to convey
the number to the telephone company in precisely
the same way regardless of his location.
2
The Court then concluded that even if the de-
fendant did harbor some subjective expectation
that the phone numbers he dialed would remain
private, society was not prepared to recognize this
expectation as reasonable. 8 The Court's conclusion
was the result of an assumption of risk analysis
27 Id. at 186 n.4, 389 A.2d at 874 n.4.
2899 S. Ct. at 2581.
29389 U.S. at 361.





developed in a series of informant cases and most
recently applied in Miller. In reaffirming its posi-
tion that a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties, the Court analogized the situation of
the bank depositor in Miller to that of the defendant
in this case. In Miller, when the depositor turned
over checks and deposit slips to the bank, he took
the risk that the information would be conveyed
by the bank to the government. Here, when the
defendant used his phone, he voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company
and "exposed" that information to its equipment
in the ordinary course of business. In using the
phone, then, the defendant assumed the risk that
the company would reveal the numbers he dialed
to the police.34
The Court also rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that since telephone companies do not usu-
ally record local calls, he had a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in making a local call. The Court
stated that under the defendant's theory, the exis-
tence of fourth amendment protection would de-
pend on the boundaries established by the phone
company for its local calling areas, and, therefore,
a "crazy quilt" would be made of the fourth
amendment.s
The Court concluded that in all probability the
defendant entertained no actual expectation of
privacy in the phone number he dialed, and that,
even if he did, his expectation was not legitimate.
Consequently, the installation and use of a pen
register was not a search and no warrant was
required.
36
Justices Stewart and Marshall each filed a dis-
senting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. 7
Justice Stewart emphasized the vital role of the
private telephone, and concluded that numbers
dialed from a private telephone-like the conver-
sations that occur during a call-are within the
constitutional protection recognized in Katz. Ac-
cording to Stewart, the information captured by
pen register surveillance emanates from private
conduct within a person's home or office-loca-
tions that without question are entitled to fourth
and fourteenth amendment protection. Further,
Stewart wrote that the information recorded by a
pen register "is an integral part of the telephonic
34
id.
35 Id. at 2583.
36id.
3 7 Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
communication that under Katz is entitled to con-
stitutional protection, whether or not it is captured
by a trespass into such an area."
' a
Justice Marshall focused his dissent on the risk
analysis relied upon by the majority. Accordihg to
Marshall, the risk analysis has two major flaws: (1)
it is idle to speak of "assuming" risks in contexts
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no
realistic alternative; (2) to make the risk analysis
dispositive in assessing the reasonableness of pri-
vacy expectations would allow the government to
define the scope of the fourth amendment protec-
tions.39 In Marshall's view, the legitimacy of pri-
vacy expectations within the meaning of Katz
should depend upon the risks an individual should
be forced to assume in a free and open society.
According to Marshall, an individual should be
entitled to assume that the numbers he dials in the
privacy of his home will be recorded, if at all, solely
for the phone company's business purposes. Ac-
cordingly, Marshall would require law enforce-
ment officials to obtain a warrant before they enlist
the telephone company to install a pen register.4°
IV
In Smith, the Supreme Court blended the two-
pronged analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Katz with the risk analysis of Miller and served
up an unpalatable result: namely, that numbers
dialed from a private home phone are entitled to
no constitutional protection.4 ' The conclusion of
the Court that there is no subjective expectation of
privacy in local numbers dialed into the telephone
system and that society will not recognize such an
expectation even if it does exist can be questioned
on two grounds. First, the Court's support for its
conclusion that individuals have no subjective ex-
pectation of privacy is weak. Second, the Court
erroneously applied the reasoning of the Miller case
38 99 S. Ct. at 2584 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
'9 Id. at 2585 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4
0 Id. at 2586.
"' The opinion is not only unpalatable but is against
the trend established by a number of circuit courts which
implied that an installation of a pen register requires
compliance with the fourth amendment. See Application
of United States for an Order, 546 F.2d 243, 245 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978); Application
of United States in Matter of Order, 538 F.2d 956, 959
(2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States
v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); United States
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809,811 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134, 1141 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Doolittle,




to the facts of this case to reach its conclusion that
society will not recognize any expectation an indi-
vidual may have that the phone numbers he dials
are private. A more reasonable approach to the
issue is that found in Justice Marshall's dissent
which would require constitutional protection of
the defendant's conduct.42 The'majority, however,
rejected Justice Marshall's approach, and by its use
of the risk analysis found in Miller has opened the
door to further intrusions by the government into
the private sphere under the guise of law enforce-
ment.
The Supreme Court, in denying that the use of
a pen register depends upon compliance with the
fourth amendment, first concluded that subscribers
have no reasonable expectation that the govern-
ment will not make records of their local calls.
43
However, the Court's argument in favor of this
conclusion is unconvincing. The Court's conclusion
that people have no expectation of privacy in local
phone numbers dialed was based primarily on its
belief that people "presumably have some aware-
ness" that pen registers are used to aid in identify-
ing persons making obscene phone calls." The
Court, however, cited no sociological data to prove
this belief," and was only able to note that most
phone books tell subscribers that the telephone
company can aid in identifying the origin of trou-
blesome calls.46 The Court offered no evidence,
though, that anyone ever reads the information
provided in telephone books.
Even if the Court was correct in its assertion that
telephone subscribers know the phone company
can monitor local calls, its conclusion that tele-
phone subscribers expect the government to mon-
itor local calls does not follow. The problem is that
the Court failed to distinguish the use of pen
registers by the telephone company for its internal
business purposes from the use of pen registers by
the phone company for government investigations.
Even if a subscriber does expect the phone com-
4299 S. Ct. at 2584-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4 99 S. Ct. at 2581.
" The Court conceded that most people may be una-
ware that pen registers are routinely employed by phone
companies to check billing operations, to detect fraud, or
to check for a defective dial. Id.
"' Id. The law review articles cited by the Court contain
no reference to any sociological studies. See Claerhout,
The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 108 (1979); Note, The
Legal Constraints upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law
Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1028 (1975).
4699 S. Ct. at 2581 (citing BALTIMORE TELEPHONE
DIRECTORY 21 (1978); Dis'mcRr OF COLUMBIA TELEPHONE
DIRECTORY 13 (1978)).
pany to monitor his phone, the subscriber probably
does not expect the telephone company, without
the safeguards of appropriate legal process, to obey
a government request to collect information' rele-
vant to a criminal prosecution.
By concluding that all subscribers should expect
the government to make records of their calls, the
Supreme Court unjustifiably has narrowed the
subjective expectations of privacy which most in-
dividuals hold. Even those with nothing illicit to
hide must now expect unregulated governmental
monitoring. As Justice Marshall noted, many in-
dividuals, including members of unpopular politi-
cal organizations or journalists with confidential
sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure
of their personal contacts. 47 Because these people
must now expect governmental access to telephone
records on less than probable cause, certain forms
of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor
that are a hallmark of free society are likely to be
impeded.48
The major flaw of the Smith decision rests in its
use of the Miller case to show that even if telephone
subscribers expect the phone numbers they dial to
be private, society is not prepared to recognize that
expectation as reasonable. As noted above, the
Court relied on Miller for the proposition that
society will not recognize any privacy right when
an individual has conveyed information to a third
party. By telling another, the individual "assumes
the risk" that the information will be disclosed to
the government.
49
The Court's reliance on Miller is misplaced for
three reasons. First, Miller did not say that society
refuses to recognize any expectation of privacy once
information is turned over to a third party. The
defendant in Miller was provided the minimal safe-
guard of appropriate legal process; the bank gave
its records to the government pursuant to a sub-
poena duces tecum.50 Therefore, the Court was
recognizing an individual's expectation that the
government cannot get information from a third
party without first going through the appropriate
legal process.
Second, even if Miller is read to hold that the
government can obtain any information conveyed
to a third party, this does not mean that Miller
allows the government to obtain all information
conveyed to a third party no matter what the form
4799 S. Ct. at 2586 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48 
id.
41 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.0Id. at 437.
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or purpose of the conveyance may have been.
Instead, Miller can and should be read as allowing
third parties to pass information to the government
only when the information was given for the third
party's own use, not when the information was
given to the third party as a medium of convey-
ance.
In Miller, the records of the defendant's accounts
pertained to transactions to which the bank was
itself a party; checks are not confidential commu-
nications but negotiable instruments to be used in
commercial transactions. The bank documents ob-
tained contained only information voluntarily con-
veyed to the bank and exposed to their employees
in the ordinary course of business. 5'
The defendant in Smith, unlike the defendant in
Miller, did not convey tangible information to the
phone company, rather he simply made use of
telephone company property. As Justice Stewart
remarked in his dissenting opinion, the observation
that when a caller dials a number the digits may
be recorded by the telephone company does no
more than describe the basic nature of telephone
calls. A telephone call simply cannot be made
without the use of telephone company property
and without payment for the service. A telephone
conversation itself must be electronically transmit-
ted by telephone company equipment and may be
recorded or overheard by use of company equip-
ment. Yet, as Justice Stewart pointed out, Katz
stands for the proposition that the user of even a
public telephone is entitled to assume that his
conversation will not be broadcast to the world.
52
The defendant in Smith, like the defendant in Katz,
was merely sending a message through the medium
of a third party; he did not voluntarily turn over
information to that third party. The telephone
company was not an active participant in the
transaction.
Third, even if Miller meant that society should
not recognize any privacy right when information
is conveyed through a third party, this risk analysis
has no place in either the subjective or objective
test of privacy. The fact that social intercourse
imposes certain risks hardly means that the govern-
ment is constitutionally unconstrained in adding
to those risks.ss This would allow the government
s' Id. at 442.
52 99 S. Ct. at 2583 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
' See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 365-408 (1974).
to tailor life's fabric with risk-producing conduct.
The power to determine the reasonableness of pri-
vacy expectations would rest with the intruder.
V
A better approach to the problem of the legiti-
macy of privacy expectations is by an application
of the fourth amendment test proposed by Justice
Marshall in his dissent. According to Marshall, the
legitimacy of privacy expectations should depend
upon the risks one should be forced to assume in a
free and open society. An individual should be
entitled to assume that both the local and long
distance numbers he dials in the privacy of his
home will be recorded, if at all, solely for the phone
company's business purposes. In Marshall's view,
to hold that the use of a pen register is not an
extensive intrusion ignores the vital role telephonic
communication plays in personal and professional
relationships.
54
Unfortunately, the majority in Smith ignored
Justice Marshall's warning of possible governmen-
tal abuse, and it found the risk analysis to be
dispositive in its fourth amendment inquiry. Under
Smith it appears that the fourth amendment pro-
tects neither people nor places but only conduct or
communication which does not involve any risk of
disclosure to a third party. Under the guise of law
enforcement, the government imposes risks on in-
dividuals. Smith serves as judicial imprimatur of
extensive governmental intrusion into the private
sphere. Perhaps greater intrusion lies ahead.
Conceivably, the next fourth amendment issue
with which the Court will be faced is the mail
cover issue discussed by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland. Although the circuit courts have upheld
mail covers, such holdings have been narrow in
scope.65 After the Smith decision, it would be sur-
prising if the Supreme Court would disallow war-
rantless use of mail covers. The rationale of Miller
that a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties is more easily applied to the use of
mail covers than to the use of pen registers. The
Smith decision can and may be used to greatly limit
the definition of private communication and con-
duct.
5' 99 S. Ct. at 2586 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
r See note 20 supra.
